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Nicaraguan voters have the choice of 22 presidential candidates in the Oct. 20 general elections.
Thirty-three political parties will participate, 15 of them in a bewildering array of alliances. Notable
among the pre- election strategies is a dramatic move toward the center by the Frente Sandinista
de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN). Some 2.3 million voters are eligible to cast ballots in the elections
for president, vice president, members of the National Assembly, deputies to the Central American
Parliament (Parlamento Centroamericano, PARLACEN), and local officials. The presidential
candidates with the greatest chance of wining the election are the ultra-conservative Arnoldo
Aleman, former mayor of Managua, who is running as the coalition candidate for the Alianza
Liberal, and the leftist Daniel Ortega, former president (1979-1990) and current secretary general of
the FSLN.
A preference poll taken in March showed Aleman leading with 36% and Ortega in second place
with 24%. The center parties collectively gathered only 9%. Even the two most prominent centrist
candidates, Antonio Lacayo of the Proyecto Nacional (PRONAL) and Sergio Ramirez of the
Movimiento de Renovacion Sandinista (MRS), received only 2% each in the preference poll. Since
that poll was taken, however, shifts in alliances, party switching by two candidates, and other last-
minute changes could have redistributed the percentages, making calculations of the voter appeal of
so many candidates difficult to measure.
Nevertheless, by all accounts the candidates to beat are still Aleman and Ortega. Aleman was
nominated by his Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) last July and he has been endorsed by
other conservative parties in a coalition called the Alianza Liberal (see NotiSur, 07/07/95). Enrique
Bolanos, a businessman with no prior party affiliation, was selected as Aleman's vice-presidential
running mate. The choice of Bolanos, who is past president of the influential business council
Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada (COSEP), signalled a general trend among parties of
both the left and right to ally themselves with private enterprise to underscore their promises of
economic growth. "The principal objective that we are seeking is the substantial and sustained
increase in production," said Bolanos. In May, the FSLN convention nominated Ortega as the party's
presidential candidate and picked Juan Manuel Caldera as his running mate.
Like Bolanos, Caldera is from the private sector and both had their property expropriated during
Ortega's Sandinista government in the 1980s. During that period, Caldera was an active contra
supporter as well. The selection came after a long search within the business community for a
running mate who could soften the Sandinista image as a party antagonistic to capitalism and
private property. The strategy of broadening the party's voter appeal by moving toward the
political center was no surprise. For more than a year, Ortega has been promising a new Sandinista
government of national unity that would guarantee private property rights and support many
elements of President Violeta de Chamorro's neoliberal economic program (see NotiSur, 11/17/95).
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Still, not all FSLN leaders embraced the idea of going outside the party for a candidate. Vilma
Nunez, president of the human rights agency Centro Nicaraguense de Derechos Humanos, who
unsuccessfully contested the presidential nomination against Ortega, criticized the strategy as
a violation of party statutes and a decision unilaterally imposed by Ortega. Nor did Caldera's
acceptance of the nomination meet with unanimous approval by his colleagues in the business
sector. "I think this was the worst mistake of his life," said a former COSEP official. "The philosophy
of the Frente Sandinista bears no relation to that of private enterprise."
But echoing the words of his vice-presidential rival Bolanos, Caldera said that his motive for
accepting the nomination was to see that the next government improves economic production.
"To produce, we need to have a guarantee...and the Frente Sandinista offers that....No other party
has paid attention to us." Ortega said that, under a new Sandinista government, "no evictions
or confiscations" would be carried out and farm collectives organized under land reforms in the
1980s as well as private property would be respected. "We are going to fight for a government of
national unity, with no rancor or hatred," said Ortega. "And the best sign of this desire by the Frente
Sandinista is the designation of our vice-presidential candidate."
Ortega also took pains to address two of the grievances against his administration that caused many
voters to turn to Chamorro in the 1990 election. At the convention, he promised that, if elected, he
would not reintroduce the military draft and he would resolve the knotty controversy regarding
indemnification for property confiscated during his previous administration (see Chronicle of
Latin American Economic Affairs, 11/02/95). "The ones who tied the knot...can untie it," he said.
"We created the problem and we have the ability to solve it under the principle of security to all
Nicaraguans.
One of the most controversial candidates is Lacayo, who was nominated in February as the
candidate for the pro- government PRONAL, which he founded last April before resigning from
Chamorro's cabinet (see NotiSur, 04/28/95). The Supreme Electoral Council (Consejo Supremo
Electoral, CSE) has yet to rule on whether Article 147 of the Constitution prohibits him, as the
president's son-in-law, from running as a presidential candidate. The Supreme Court (Corte
Suprema de Justicia) has already ruled against various briefs filed by Lacayo for immunity from
the prohibition. His running mate, Benjamin Lanzas, says that he will take over as the party's
presidential candidate if the CSE rules against Lacayo. Besides his precarious candidacy, Lacayo
faces a possible corruption scandal. He has recently denied charges that, as a cabinet minister, he
diverted government funds to his campaign treasury.
The funds came from a Venezuelan loan intended for road building. The allegations appeared
in the Sandinista newspaper Barricada, which cited a confidential report from the Venezuelan
diplomatic mission in Managua linking Lacayo to misuse of the funds. Lacayo said the FSLN was
trying to "tarnish" his image, and called on the comptroller general to open an investigation to clear
his name. No formal charges or official investigation has yet come from the Barricada accusations.
Another presidential candidate faces potentially more serious accusations. Alvaro Robelo of the
Movimiento Arriba Nicaragua (MAN) was accused of money-laundering and related criminal
offenses.
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The charges stem from a report by an Italian prosecutor who said the Banco Europeo de
Centroamerica in Managua, of which Robelo is the principal shareholder, was part of an
international conspiracy to launder US$12.5 billion in Italian Mafia drug money. Robelo denied the
charges and accused the government of plotting to discredit his candidacy. The MAN is said to have
spent US$3 million in campaign promotion since January months before the official Aug. 4 opening
of the 75-day presidential campaign. In another potential scandal, Robelo admits to owing the port
administration (Empresa Nacional Administradora de Puertos ENAP) US$74,000 but says that he is
negotiating with ENAP to repay the money.
Adding to his troubles, the CSE must rule on whether, as a dual Italian and Nicaraguan citizen,
Robelo legally can be a presidential candidate. When the allegations of corruption surfaced, MAN
withdrew its presidential nomination from Robelo. Sources said party leaders were not satisfied
with his responses to the money- laundering charges and his explanations of the origin of his
campaign funds.
A week later, the Alianza Nicaraguense, made up of the Union Democrata Cristiana (UDC) and
the Accion Conservadora de Nicaragua (ACN), named Robelo as its candidate. MAN quickly
jumped into an alliance with the Partido de Unidad Liberal (PUL) behind the candidacy of another
banker, Haroldo Montealegre. Meanwhile, in switching to the Alianza Nicaraguense ticket, Robelo
bumped legislative deputy Azucena Ferrey as the UDC's presidential candidate. She then bolted
the party with three other UDC leaders and joined UNO-96, a coalition of the Partido Nacional
Democrata (PND), the Movimiento Democratico Nicaraguense (MDN), and the Movimiento Accion
Conservadora (MAC). UNO-96 is, in name at least, a reincarnation of the Union Nacional Opositora
(UNO), the coalition that ran Chamorro in her successful bid to unseat Ortega in 1994.
The UNO-96 candidate is former president of the National Assembly Alfredo Cesar. None of the
candidacies is certain, however, until the CSE rules on all formal challenges filed by June 12. Moises
Hassan Morales, candidate for the Movimiento de Accion Renovadora (MAR), challenged Ortega's
candidacy, accusing him of "illicit enrichment" during his presidency. Hassan also challenged
Lacayo, based on Article 147, and Robelo for his alleged Mafia connections. The October election
will present a marked contrast to the 1990 elections in which only nine parties were registered
and several moderate and right-wing parties were able to unite in the UNO coalition against the
governing FSLN.
For the 1996 elections, there will be no such broad-based alliance to defeat the two front runners.
The Nicaraguan political spectrum is chopped up into 42 political parties, most of them microparties
with little chance to win more than a handful of votes. "I think it's a disease, like some kind of
national schizophrenia," said poet Pablo Antonio Cuadra. "There's never been such a proliferation
and fragmentation as there is now."
The fragmentation reflects the failure of Lacayo and other prominent moderates to attract the broad
support they expected. In launching PRONAL, Lacayo clearly planned to run on Chamorro's record
and called on other parties to join him in "a great coalition to continue the peaceful democratic
revolution we began in 1990" (see NotiSur, 04/28/96). In mid-May, leaders of seven parties
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attempted to forge just such a centrist alliance as an alternative to Aleman on the right and Ortega
on the left. Alfredo Cesar said that if either Aleman or Ortega were to win the election, there could
be social conflict and even "an armed conflict." Had the effort succeeded, Aleman and Ortega would
have faced a center opposition with greater voter potential than that of either of their parties. Some
estimates suggest that a candidate heading such a center coalition could approach the 45% plurality
needed to win in the October first-round election.
Before joining the centrist talks, former Sandinista guerrilla leader and later contra leader Eden
Pastora of the Partido Accion Democratica (PAD) announced that he was open to an alliance with
any party, Sandinista or conservative or anywhere in between. After an unsuccessful attempt
to ally with former leaders of the defunct Resistencia Nicaraguense, made up of former contras,
Pastora joined the talks for a centrist alliance, as did Sergio Ramirez. Earlier in the year, Ramirez had
rejected overtures from Ortega to form an alliance with the FSLN (see NotiSur, 01/26/96). Instead, he
tried the centrist alternative "to save the country from polarization."
By mid-May, however, the centrist effort foundered on the question of who would head the ticket.
Lacayo, Ramirez, and Pastora each insisted on becoming the alliance's presidential candidate.
With the collapse of negotiations, the seven party leaders registered as single-party candidates or
sought other alliances. In announcing that MRS would go it alone, Ramirez said, "There is no longer
any possible alternative for us." Left out of the alliance scrimmage were several splinter parties
such as the Partido Comunista (PCdN), the Partido Socialista Nicaraguense (PSN), and the Partido
Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) who may disappear as officially recognized parties after
the elections unless each wins at least one seat in the Assembly.
Meanwhile, authorities fear that an electoral time bomb left over from the war between the
Sandinista government and the US-backed contra forces will interfere with the electoral process.
Hundreds of former fighters operate in the northern and central regions staging raids, assaults and
kidnappings. The CSE estimates that as many as 12% of voters will not cast their ballots because of
fear of bandit attacks. However, election officials announced a security plan to deal with the threat.
On a budget of US$4 million, the CSE will send electoral police to guard voter registration sites
around the country. In addition, extra military forces will patrol municipalities in northern and
central zones.
The government has applied to the international community for US$8 million to offset the costs of
pacifying these areas during the election period. During the first phase of voter registration in the
26 municipalities in the unsafe regions, an observer working for the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) was kidnapped. US citizen Cindy Gersony and her Nicaraguan guide
Antonio Moncada were kidnapped in the municipality of Wiwili in Jinotega department on May 31
by members of an outlaw band led by former contra and former police officer Alejandro Moncada.
The two were freed unharmed a day later, but CSE magistrates are still concerned that voting could
be interrupted on Oct. 20. [Sources: Reuter, 03/17/96, 05/04/96, 05/06/96; Inter Press Service, 05/17/06;
Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala), 05/02/96, 05/16/96, 05/30/96; Agence France-Presse,
04/30/96, 05/05/96, 05/06/96, 05/16/96, 05/21/96, 05/22/96, 05/28/96, 05/29/96, 06/01/96, 06/03/96;
Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias Spanish News Service, 04/30/96, 05/01/95, 05/05/96, 05/09/96,
05/20/96, 06/13/96]
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